Abstract. We present a general treatment of all non-cryptographic (i.e., information-theoretically secure) linear verifiable-secret-sharing (VSS) and distributed-commitment (DC) schemes, based on an underlying secret sharing scheme, pairwise checks between players, complaints, and accusations of the dealer. VSS and DC are main building blocks for unconditional secure multi-party computation protocols. This general approach covers all known linear VSS and DC schemes. The main theorem states that the security of a scheme is equivalent to a pure linear-algebra condition on the linear mappings (e.g. described as matrices and vectors) describing the scheme. The security of all known schemes follows as corollaries whose proofs are pure linear-algebra arguments, in contrast to some hybrid arguments used in the literature. Our approach is demonstrated for the CDM DC scheme, which we generalize to be secure against mixed adversary settings (some curious and some dishonest players), and for the classical BGW VSS scheme, for which we show that some of the checks between players are superfluous, i.e., the scheme is not optimal. More generally, our approach, establishing the minimal conditions for security (and hence the common denominator of the known schemes), can lead to the design of more efficient VSS and DC schemes for general adversary structures.
Introduction
The concept of secret sharing was introduced by Shamir [12] as a means to protect a secret simultaneously from exposure and from being lost. It allows a so called dealer to share the secret among a set of entities, usually called players, in such a way that only certain specified subsets of the players are able to reconstruct the secret (if needed) while smaller subsets have no information about it. While secret sharing only guarantees security against curious players that try to gather information they are not supposed to obtain but otherwise behave honestly, its stronger version verifiable secret sharing (VSS), introduced in [4] , is secure in the following sense against dishonest players (which are of course also curious) and a dishonest dealer that behave in an arbitrary manner.
Privacy: If the dealer is honest, then the curious players learn nothing about the secret k. Correctness: After the secret is shared, there exists a unique value k that can be reconstructed by the players (no matter how the dishonest players behave), and for an honest dealer k is equal to the shared secret k.
Reconstruction must work even if the dealer does not cooperate in the reconstruction. If an efficient reconstruction of the secret requires the cooperation of the dealer, then such a scheme is called a distributed commitment (DC) scheme. In such a scheme a dishonest dealer can prevent the reconstruction by refusing to cooperate, but he cannot achieve that a different secret is reconstructed, not even with the help of the dishonest players. A DC scheme is almost a VSS, except for the efficiency of the reconstruction, since the players could try all possible behaviors of the dealer in the reconstruction.
Linear VSS and DC schemes are a main building block for general secure multi-party protocols. Linearity implies that any linear function on shared values can be computed without interaction by each player (locally) computing the linear function on the corresponding individual shares.
The goal of this paper is a unified treatment of (linear) VSS and DC schemes. We present a very natural and general sharing protocol which converts an arbitrary given linear secret sharing scheme into a DC (or VSS) scheme, provided of course that this is possible at all, by enforcing pairwise consistency among the shares of the (honest) players. Namely, by pairwise checking, complaining and accusing, it ensures that pairwise linear dependences among the shares that should hold do hold. This seems to be not only a very natural but the only possible approach for the construction of secure DC and VSS schemes in our model (i.e. unconditionally secure and zero error probability), and indeed, all known schemes can be seen as concrete instances of this general approach. Then we state the condition under which such a scheme is a secure DC (or VSS) scheme. This characterization is a predicate in the language of pure linear algebra, depending only on the parameters of the underlying secret sharing scheme and of the sharing protocol.
As a consequence, the security of all known schemes (and possibly even all future ones) follow as corollaries whose proofs are linear-algebra arguments, in contrast to some hybrid arguments used in the literature. This is demonstrated for two schemes, for the CDM DC scheme of [5] and for the classical BGW VSS scheme of [1] . We show how the security of the CDM DC scheme can be proven by a simple linear-algebra argument -even with respect to a mixed adversary which strictly generalizes the results of [5] -and characterize the general-adversary condition under which a secure VSS scheme exists. For the BGW VSS scheme, we show that some of the checks between players are superfluous, i.e., the scheme is not optimal. This also shows that arguing about the security of such schemes becomes conceptually simpler. Finally, our approach, establishing the minimal conditions for security, can lead to the design of linear VSS or DC schemes for general adversary structures which are more efficient than the schemes resulting from generic constructions as for instance that of [5] .
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we introduce the notation we use throughout the paper, describe the communication and adversary model and define VSS and DC schemes. In Section 3, we consider general, i.e. not necessarily linear, secret sharing schemes and investigate what is needed to achieve a unique reconstruction as required by the above correctness property, while in Section 4 we then show how this is reduced to a linear-algebraic property in case of linear schemes. In Section 5 and 6 we then discuss the already mentioned applications to the existing schemes of [5] and [1] , and in Section 7 we draw some final conclusions.
Preliminaries

Notation
Throughout the paper, P stands for the player set P = {p 1 , . . . , p n }, and for simplicity we set p i = i. We call a subset Π of the power set 2 P of P a (monotone) structure of P if it is closed under taking subsets, i.e., if P ∈ Π and P ⊆ P implies P ∈ Π. We call it a (monotone) anti-structure if it is closed under taking supersets, i.e., if the complement Π c := {P ∈ 2 P | P ∈ Π} is a structure. Given two structures Π 1 and Π 2 , Π 1 Π 2 denotes the element-wise union, i.e., the structure
Consider a finite set K (the set of secrets), n finite sets S 1 , . . . , S n , where S i is the set of possible shares for player p i , and let S be the Cartesian product S = S 1 × · · · × S n . Elements of S will sometimes be called a sharing.
For two sharings s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ands = (s 1 , . . . ,s n ), the set δ(s,s) ⊆ P is defined as δ(s,s) := {i ∈ P | s i =s i }.
Note that δ can be treated similar to a metric, as for all s, s , s ∈ S we have
For a subset Q = {i 1 , . . . , i } ⊆ P, a sharing s ∈ S and a subset U ⊆ S of sharings, pr Q denotes the projection pr Q : S → S i1 × · · · × S i , and s Q and U Q stand for s Q = pr Q (s) and U Q = {pr Q (u) | u ∈ U }, respectively. Finally, if S 1 , . . . , S n and hence S are in fact vector spaces, which will be the case in Section 4, then, for a sharing s ∈ S, the support supp(s) denotes the smallest set Q ⊆ P with pr P\Q (s) = (0, . . . , 0), in other words supp(s) = δ(s, 0), and, for
Model
We consider the secure-channels model, as introduced in [1, 3] , where the set of players (including the dealer) is connected by bilateral synchronous reliable secure channels. Broadcast channels are not assumed to be available, though can be implemented for the cases we consider [2, 8] and thus will be treated as given primitives.
Like in previous literature on VSS and secure multi-party computation, we consider a central adversary who can corrupt players, subject to certain constraints, for example an upper bound on the total number of corrupted players. The selection of which player to corrupt can be adaptive, depending on the course of the protocol. The dealer is one of the players that can potentially also be corrupted.
Passive corruption of a player means that the adversary learns the player's entire information, but the player performs the protocol correctly. This models what is often also called "honest but curious" players. Active corruption of a player means that the adversary takes full control and can make the player deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary manner. Such a player is also called dishonest, or simply a cheater. Active corruption is hence strictly stronger than passive corruption. The adversary is characterized by a privacy structure ∆ ⊆ P and an adversary structure A ⊆ ∆ with the intended meaning that the adversary can be tolerated to corrupt any players passively or actively (one variant being the upgrading of a passive corruption to an active corruption), as long as the total set D of corrupted players satisfies D ∈ ∆ and the subset A of them being actively corrupted satisfies A ∈ A. In other words, all players in D\A are honest but curious. The complement H = A c is sometimes called the honest-players structure.
Finally, we assume that the adversary has unbounded computing power, and we achieve zero error probability.
Definition of VSS and DC
Let K be a finite set (as described in Section 2.1), let ∆ be a privacy structure, and let A ⊆ ∆ be an adversary structure (as described in Section 2.2). 
Reconstruction must work even if the dealer does not cooperate in the reconstruction. If an efficient reconstruction of the secret requires the cooperation of the dealer, then such a scheme is called a distributed commitment (DC) scheme.
In a DC scheme, a dishonest dealer can prevent the (efficient) reconstruction by refusing to cooperate correctly, but he cannot achieve that a different secret is reconstructed, not even with the help of the dishonest players. Note that if one would define a default value for the case the dealer refuses to reconstruct, then a cheating dealer would not be committed because he could open a sharing in two different ways: as the real or as the default value.
A VSS or DC scheme is called linear if the list of shares, i.e., the information given to the players during the sharing phase, is a linear function of the secret and randomly chosen values.
General Schemes
Even though our goal is a general treatment of linear schemes, we first consider arbitrary, not necessarily linear secret sharing schemes and discuss facts that are independent of the linearity of the scheme. More precisely, we present a sufficient condition on the (possibly not correctly) distributed shares in order to have uniqueness of the shared secret as required by the correctness property of VSS and DC schemes. And then, in the next section, we show how this can be achieved using linear schemes.
Most of the arguments of this section have been used -implicitly or explicitly -in the literature, but typically with respect to some restricted model. This unification not only generalizes arguments that have been used before (to nonlinear schemes and to a mixed adversary), it also leads to a better understanding of the security of (linear and general) VSS and DC schemes.
Let K and S = S 1 × · · · × S n be defined as defined in Section 2.1.
Definition 2.
A secret sharing scheme is given by a joint conditional probability distribution
The privacy structure ∆ is defined as the structure
and the access structure Γ is defined as the anti-structure
Typically, a secret sharing scheme P S|K is given in terms of an (efficiently computable) function f : K × R → S, where R is some finite set, such that P S|K (·, k) is the distribution of f (k, r) for a uniformly random chosen r ∈ R. This is often directly used as the definition of a secret sharing scheme. Note that we do not require, as is usually the case in the literature, that the privacy structure ∆ be the complement Γ c of the access structure Γ , but for linear schemes this is the case.
By the definition of ∆ and Γ , the following properties are guaranteed. Hence, the correctness property guarantees that the secret is uniquely defined by the set of shares even if some are missing, i.e., in this sense the scheme is robust against lost shares. We now investigate what it means to be robust against incorrect shares. Let A ⊆ ∆ be an adversary structure.
Proposition 1. The following robustness property is fulfilled if and only if
Robustness: For any (s, k) ∈ corr, any sharings with δ(s,s) ∈ A uniquely defines k, in the sense that for anys ∈ S
Namely, by the definition of Γ , (1) holds if and only if for every pair
Note that in the literature A typically coincides with ∆ and, as already mentioned, ∆ with Γ c , in which case P ∈ Γ c A A coincides with the Q 3 property of [10] which states that no three sets in A cover P, which itself generalizes the classical bound t < n/3. However, we consider this more general case because it gives deeper insight but also because it makes perfect sense to separate the privacy from the adversary structure, i.e., to consider curious as well as dishonest players as argued in Section 2, and in fact will generalize in Section 5 the DC scheme from [5] to such mixed adversaries.
Robustness guarantees that the secret is uniquely defined by the set of shares even if some might be incorrect. If, as usual, the secret k is shared by a so-called dealer by choosing s according to P S|K ( · , k) and distributing the shares among the players in P, then this allows the correct reconstruction of the secret even if the players of a set A ∈ A are dishonest and do not provide correct shares. However, this is only guaranteed to hold if the dealer is honest and indeed distributes a correct sharing s of k. Hence, it seems that to achieve security against a possibly dishonest dealer, in the sense that a unique secret is defined, the dealer has to be forced to distribute a correct sharing s. We will now show in the remainder of this section that this is actually overkill and a weaker condition already suffices. It is easy to verify that the access structure Γ coincides with
Hence, arguing as before, we have 
Hence, if indeed P ∈ Γ c A A, as long as the dealer is partially honest and hands out a consistent (but not necessarily correct) sharing s, there is a unique secret k defined, assuming that the shares s H of an honest-players set H ∈ H = A c remain unchanged. We finally show that this even holds as long as the dealer hands out a consistent sharing s H for the players in H. 
Proposition 3. The following very strong robustness property is fulfilled for an arbitrary reconstruction function ρ if and only if P ∈
Indeed, (3) holds if and only if H ∩ H ∈ Γ for all H, H ∈ H, which is equivalent to P \ (A 1 ∪ A 2 ) ∈ Γ for all A 1 , A 2 ∈ A, which, as already noticed earlier, is equivalent to P ∈ Γ c A A.
Linear Schemes
We have seen in the above Section 3 that the uniqueness of the shared secret (that is required by the correctness property of VSS or DC) is guaranteed if (and only if) P ∈ Γ c A A and if the dealer is at least partially honest and hands out a consistent sharing to the honest players, or if he can be forced to behave this way. In this section we now concentrate on linear schemes, and we present a very natural sharing protocol which enforces some kind of consistency. Namely, by pairwise checking, complaining and accusing, it ensures pairwise consistency among the shares (of the honest players). All known DC and VSS schemes can be seen as concrete instances of this general approach. Finally, we give a characterization in the language of linear algebra of when the sharing protocol results in a secure DC (or VSS) scheme. As a consequence, the security of all known schemes follow as corollaries whose proofs are linear-algebra arguments, and, more generally, it becomes conceptually very simple to argue about the security of such schemes, as it involves only pure linear algebra.
From now on, K is a field, and S 1 , . . . , S n are vector spaces over K with inner products ·, · S1 , . . . , ·, · Sn , respectively, which naturally induce an inner product ·, · S for the vector space
As usual in linear algebra, for a subset U ⊆ S, span(U ) denotes the subspace consisting of all linear combinations of vectors in U and the orthogonal complement U ⊥ S is the subspace defined by
Secret Sharing
A linear secret sharing scheme is given by a pair (M, ε), consisting of a linear map
and a vector ε ∈ V, where V is a vector space over the field K with inner product ·, · V and S is as described above. A secret k ∈ K is shared by choosing a random x ∈ V such that ε, x V = k and computing s as s = Mx. Consider the special case where V = K e for some e and S i = K di for some d 1 , . . . , d n , where every inner product is the respective standard inner product, and where M is a matrix multiplication M :
In this case, (M, ε) is called a monotone span program [11] . Clearly, by fixing orthogonal bases of V and S 1 , . . . , S n , respectively, one can always have this simplified and more familiar view. However, as this simplification might (and indeed would in Section 5.1) destroy the naturalness of additional structures in V or S, we keep this more general view. Nevertheless, because of this reduction, it follows from [11] that the access structure Γ and the privacy structure ∆ of a linear secret sharing scheme (M, ε) are given by 5 We slightly abuse notation and use the same symbol, M , for the matrix M ∈ K Σd i ×e as well as the corresponding linear map M :
and ∆ = Γ c , respectively, where M * : S → V is the conjugate of M (i.e. such that λ, M x S = M * λ, x V for all λ ∈ S and x ∈ V, and, in the simplified monotone span program view, M * = M T , the transposed matrix). Furthermore, any subset Λ of
which is complete in the sense that for every Q ∈ Γ there exists λ ∈ Λ| Q , naturally induces a reconstruction function ρ :
Verifiable Secret Sharing and Distributed Commitments
Consider a linear secret sharing scheme, given by M : V → S = S 1 × · · · × S n and ε ∈ V, with an access structure Γ . According to Section 3, in order to turn this scheme into a DC scheme or a VSS, secure against the privacy structure ∆ = Γ c and the adversary structure A ⊆ ∆, it is necessary that P ∈ ∆ A A, and additionally, as part of the sharing procedure, it has to be checked that the dealer behaves partially honest and hands out a consistent sharing with respect to some reconstruction function ρ to the honest players. However, it seems to be impossible to directly check this kind of consistency, i.e. to verify something like λ, s = λ , s for λ = λ , without violating privacy. The only thing that can be checked without violating privacy is pairwise consistency, i.e. whether (some) pairwise linear dependences γ, s = 0 with supp(γ) = {i, j} that should hold indeed do hold; namely by comparing in private the respective contributions γ i , s i and γ j , s j (which, up to the sign, are supposed to be equal) of the two involved players. A player complains in case of a pairwise inconsistency, but this may be due to the dealer's or another player's misbehavior, and he accuses (the dealer) if he knows that the dealer misbehaved. In any case, the dealer has to publicly clarify the situation, such that finally the shares of all honest players are pairwise consistent and privacy is satisfied. This is described in full detail in the protocol Share below. Finally, a simple linear algebra condition is given that is sufficient (and also necessary) in order for the pairwise consistency to imply consistency with respect to a given reconstruction function, and hence in order for the scheme to result in a secure DC respectively VSS.
Consider the set
of all possible (pairwise) checking vectors, where kerM * denotes the kernel kerM * = {ξ ∈ S | M * ξ = 0} of M * . Clearly, for any γ ∈ Checks(M ) and any correct sharing s = Mx, we have
For an arbitrary but fixed subset C ∈ Checks(M ), the following sharing protocol enforces pairwise consistency with respect to the checking vectors γ ∈ C among the players that remain honest during the execution, without revealing any information about the shared secret. The concrete choice of the protocol is somewhat arbitrary, in that it can be modified in different ways without loosing its functionality and without nullifying the upcoming results. For instance, techniques from [9] can be applied to improve the round complexity (at the cost of an increased communication complexity), and some secret sharing schemes M allow "early stopping".
Protocol Share (M,ε),C (k) 1. The dealer chooses a random x ∈ V such that ε, x = k, computes s = Mx and sends to every player p i ∈ P the corresponding share s i . 2. For every checking vector γ ∈ C, it is as follows checked whether γ, s S = 0:
If supp(γ) = {p i }, then player p i verifies whether γ i , s i Si = 0, and he broadcasts an "accusation" against the dealer if it does not hold. If supp(γ) = {p i , p j } with p i < p j , then then player p i sends c ij = γ i , s i Si to p j who verifies whether c ij + γ j , s j Sj = 0 and broadcasts a "complaint" if it does not hold. The dealer answers such a complaint by broadcasting c ij = γ i , s i , and if this value does not coincide with p i 's c ij respectively if it does not fulfill c ij + γ j , s j Sj = 0, then player p i respectively p j broadcasts an "accusation" against the dealer. 3. The following is repeated until there is no further "accusation" or the dealer is declared faulty (which requires at most n rounds). For every "accusation" from a player p i , the dealer answers by broadcasting p i 's share s i , and p i replaces his share by this s i . If this share contradicts the share of some player p j , in the sense that γ i , s i Si + γ j , s j Sj = 0 for some γ ∈ C with supp(γ) = {p i , p j }, then p j broadcasts an "accusation" (if he has not yet done so in an earlier step). If this share s i contradicts itself, in the sense that γ i , s i = 0 for some γ ∈ C with supp(γ) = {p i }, or it contradicts a share s j that has already been broadcast, then the dealer is publicly declared to be faulty.
It is easy to see that if the dealer remains honest, then no matter what the dishonest players do, nobody learns anything beyond his share, and hence the players of any set D ∈ ∆ learn nothing about the shared secret. Furthermore, independent of the behavior of the dishonest players, if H denotes the set of players that remain honest during the protocol execution (though some might become curious) then the protocol achieves pairwise consistency among the players in H, i.e., γ, s S = 0 for every γ ∈ C| H , or, in other words,
In order for the protocol to achieve consistency with respect to a reconstruction function ρ, it must be guaranteed for a complete subset of reconstruction vectors Λ ⊆ Λ max that λ, s = λ , s for all λ, λ ∈ Λ| H , or, in other words, that
This implies
Proposition 4. Let ρ : Γ × S → K be a reconstruction function induced by a complete subset of reconstruction vectors Λ ⊆ Λ max (as defined Section 4.1)
. Then, the sharing protocol Share (M,ε),C is guaranteed to produce a consistent sharing for the honest players with respect to ρ if and only if
Combing this with Proposition 3 leads to Proof. With respect to a not necessarily efficient reconstruction procedure, the claim follows from Proposition 4 and 3 (even without the additional requirement for the VSS case). It remains to show the existence of efficient reconstruction procedures: In the DC reconstruction, the dealer publishes the vector x used in
Step 1 of the sharing protocol and every player p i publishes his share s i , and then the players take k = ε, x V as the reconstructed secret if δ(Mx, s) ∈ A and reject the reconstruction otherwise (as if the dealer had refused to take part at all). In the VSS reconstruction, every player p i publishes his share s i , then any share s i that is pairwise inconsistent (with respect to the checking vectors in C) with the shares of a set A ∈ A is rejected, and the secret is reconstructed from the accepted shares by applying the reconstruction function ρ induced by Λ. Note that the additional requirement for C implies that all accepted shares are pairwise consistent and hence consistent with respect to ρ.
To our knowledge, the condition P ∈ ∆ A A for VSS to be possible has not been stated previously in the literature, although the condition for secure multiparty computation has been given in [7] . In the threshold case, this confirms Lemma 1 of [6] : If the total number of (passively) corrupted players is t and if w of them can even be actively corrupted, then VSS is possible if and only if t + 2w < n.
The following lemma will be helpful in the next section.
Lemma 1. Predicate (4) is fulfilled if every pair λ, λ ∈ Λ fulfills
λ − λ ∈ span(C| supp(λ)∪supp(λ ) ) .
Proof.
Let H ∈ H be arbitrary but fixed. Then, for λ, λ ∈ Λ| H ⊆ Λ, we have by assumption λ − λ ∈ span(C| supp(λ)∪supp(λ ) ), which is of course contained in span(C| H ).
Application I: Proving the Security of the CDM Scheme
We now demonstrate the power of Theorem 1 and prove the security of the CDM DC scheme [5] by proving a pure linear-algebra statement. We only have to show that {λ − λ | λ, λ ∈ Λ| H } ⊆ span(C| H ) for every H ∈ H, or, and that is what we are going to do, that λ − λ ∈ span(C| supp(λ)∪supp(λ ) ) for every pair λ, λ ∈ Λ.
As a by-product, because of our general treatment in Section 3, we generalize the CDM DC scheme to a mixed adversary.
The CDM Scheme
In [5] , a generic construction was presented to convert any linear secret sharing scheme, described by a monotone span program, into a linear DC scheme. As mentioned in Section 4, a monotone span program is given by a matrix M • ∈ K Σdi×e and a vector ε • ∈ K e . The CDM DC scheme works as follows, assuming for simplification that ε It is not hard to see that this scheme is a concrete instance of the class of schemes described in the previous section. Indeed, it coincides with Share (M,ε),C for M , ε and C as described in the following. M is the linear map
where V is the vector space consisting of all symmetric e × e-matrices over K and ·, · V is given by
for matrices a and b in V with entries a [i, j] and b [i, j] . Furthermore, ε ∈ V is the matrix with a 1 in the upper left corner and zeros otherwise, and the set C is given by
where µ ij ∈ S has M • j as i-th row and zero-entries otherwise. In this example the checking vectors γ ∈ C are in fact matrices.
Note that S = S 1 × · · · × S n with S i = K e (and ·, · Si the standard inner product) is interpreted as S = K n×e . Hence, for any matrix s ∈ S, s i is the i-th row of s, and therefore if
ε, X V = k if and only if the upper left corner of X is k and for a check vector
Hence, Share (M,ε),C indeed coincides with the CDM protocol [5] .
Finally, note that (as it is also shown in [5] ) the access structure Γ of the secret sharing scheme (M, ε) coincides with the access structure Γ • of the original scheme (M • , ε • ).
The Security Proof
If λ • is a reconstruction vector for the original secret sharing scheme ( 
which proves the claim.
Application II: Reducing the Number of Checks in the BGW Scheme
Theorem 1 tells us that as long as the set {λ − λ | λ, λ ∈ Λ| H } is contained in the subspace span(C| H ) ⊆ S, where H ∈ H collects the honest players, the corresponding scheme is secure. By this it is obvious that if the vectors in C| H are not linearly independent, then C| H contains more vectors than actually needed. We will now use this simple observation to reduce the number of checks in the (symmetric version of the) BGW VSS scheme [1] . As the proof is purely technical and does not give any new insight, it is moved to the appendix. Similarly, it can be shown using linear algebra that C {i,j} ⊆ span(C| {i}∪Q ∪ C| {j}∪Q ) for all i, j and every Q with |Q| ≥ t + 1. The following corollary follows now from Theorem 1, showing that (the symmetric version of) the classical VSS scheme of [1] is not optimal with respect to the number of required pairwise checks.
Corollary 2. The symmetric version of the BGW VSS scheme with threshold privacy structure ∆ = {D ⊆ P | |D| ≤ t} is secure with respect to a threshold adversary structure A = {A ⊆ P | |A| ≤ w} with w ≤ t if and only if n > t + 2w, even if C is replaced byC
= {γ ij ∈ C | j > w} .
Proof. Let H be the set of honest players, hence |H| ≥ n−w > t+w. Clearly, the set Q * = {i ∈ H | i > w} is in Γ and henceC| H = {γ ij ∈ C| H | i ∈ Q * or j ∈ Q * } fulfills span(C| H ) = span(C| H ).
Alternatively, this shows that the classical BGW VSS scheme allows "early stopping", as it is also used in the 4-round VSS of [9] .
